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MANAGEMENT AND 
DECLINING R&D 
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Shauna Cohen 
I. INTRODUCTION 
America appears to have lost its competitive edge 
in many world markets. For example, the U.S. auto and steel industries which 
were formerly leaders in world markets are now facing stiffer competition from 
both European and Japanese firms. In 1960, foreign producers claimed a negli-
gible share of the U.S. car market. However, by 1979 this figure jumped to over 
30o/o (Business Week , June 30, 1980, p. 60). In 1950, the U.S. produced almost 
47o/o of the world's steel; by 1980, this figure had dropped to only 14.1 o/o (American 
Iron and Steel Institute, 1981). 
The penetration of foreign producers into domestic markets has become an 
increasingly disturbing issue to U.S. corporations. Many observers feel this may 
be due in part to the U.S. businessmen's low priority in investing funds in research 
and development (R&D) for future innovations. 
This paper examines the relationship between R&D and productivity. It 
discusses the reasons why top executives in the U.S. may have adopted a short-
run business mentality and how this may have led to declining R&D expenditures. 
It then describes the consequences of this attitude and its resulting practices upon 
U.S. industry. 
II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The objectives of R&D are to improve existing products and methods and to create 
new ones. Innovation provides the essential technological edge which facilitates 
success in world markets. The significance of these developments is often 
underestimated because they rapidly become a part of our daily routine. For ex-
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ample, the television, jet travel and digital computer industries were nonexistent 
in 1945; but by 1965 they contributed more than 13 billion dollars to the Gross 
National Product (GNP) and employed an estimated 900,000 workers (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 1971). 
R&D directly increases both the depth and breadth of technological knowledge. 
Economists estimate that 50-80o/o of the real dollar growth in U.S. GNP is at-
tributable to productivity gains, nearly all of which flow from new technology. 
There is rarely disagreement among experts over the significance of R&D as a 
prime mover of the U.S. economy (National Academy of Sciences, 1971, p. 357). 
Recently, expenditures on R&D have been rising significantly in many 
developed economies. For example, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP 
by West Germany have risen from 1.8o/o in 1967 to 2.2o/o in 1978. Similarly, 
Japanese expenditures have risen from 1.3o/o of GNP in 1967 to 1.9o/o in 1978. 
Expenditures in the U.S., however, have dropped from a 1967 peak of 2.9o/o to 
slightly above 2.2o/o in 1978 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, 1980). U.S. spending on R&D, in constant 1972 dollars, reached a peak of 
$29.8 billion in 1968 and then hovered between $29 billion and $27 billion through 
1976. Expenditures in 1979 were only $31.2 billion, which was only a 5o/o increase 
over the 1968 figure (Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 60). 
Many claim that too much of the R&D budget in the typical U.S. firm is devoted 
to complying with government regulations. In the chemical industry, for exam-
ple, research managers estimate that regulations account for 10o/o to 15o/o of R&D 
budgets (Business Week, July 7, 1980, p. 48). Also, the R&D budget may in fact 
often be an overestimate of effective expenditures. The percentage spent on basic 
research has declined in recent years, while the amount spent on improving ex-
isting products has increased. Another method of further slashing the R&D budget 
is to use the funds for other purposes and to charge the R&D department for the 
cost. 
Rates of productivity growth in the U.S. have also been declining over the 
past few decades. Between 1948 and 1968, output per manhour increased at an 
annual rate of 3.2o/o. Between 1968 and 1973, however, this rate declined to 1.9o/o 
and during the next six years dropped to a mere 0.7%. The lower rate of growth 
in productivity is due in large part to the high employment growth of the service 
industries where productivity gains are difficult to achieve. However, in manufac-
turing activities productivity growth has also fallen sharply. For example, between 
1963 and 1973 output per manhour grew at an annual rate of 2.9o/o but between 
1973 and 1979 this rate had declined to 1.6o/o (Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 65). 
In the minds of many observers, this decline in U.S. productivity growth can 
be closely linked to the decline in R&D. One survey on the subject, undertaken 
in the summer of 1978 and again in fall 1980, examined the attitudes of both 
workers and business managers with respect to the reasons underlying the 
slowdown in productivity. Excessive government regulation, inadequate capital 
investment, poor worker attitudes and the general business climate were cited 
as primary reasons. Inadequate R&D spending, while only rated as the ninth most 
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important factor in the 1978 survey, rose to fifth place by 1980. It was mentioned 
by 79o/o of the 1980 respondents as a major influence on the productivity level. 
Studies by prominent economists such as John Kendrick and Edward Denison 
have lent further support to the importance of sufficient R&D spending. Accord-
ing to these studies, low R&D spending might account for as much as 1 Oo/o of the 
recent productivity decline (U.S. Subcommittee on Sciene and Technology, 1981, 
Rahn, p. 670). 
If productivity is indeed the crucial factor underlying U.S. economic growth 
and if R&D is a major cause of productivity growth, why is it then that R&D spend-
ing has hit such low levels in recent years? Most traditional explanations of the 
R&D slowdown blame the ills of inflation, high interest rates, and uncertainty 
concerning the economy and unemployment. Recently, however, a new school of 
thought has emerged which focuses more intensely upon changes in managerial 
attitudes and practices. According to this new thinking, management has shifted 
away from viewing the business entity as a long-term entrepreneurial undertaking 
toward one which has set its sights on maximizing short-run profits. Successful 
firms are those who make a long-term commitment to compete in world markets 
by continuously offering superior products and using technologically superior 
methods of production (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980, p. 68). Many experts have 
claimed that U.S. business executives seem to have discarded this principle, 
however, and have instead limited their efforts to short-run considerations. For 
example, Douglas White, Senior Vice President of the American Productivity 
Center in Houston, Texas, has stated: 
I think one of our greatest problems is, and it's probably one of our greatest 
strengths, that we expect quick fixes .... We suddenly somehow feel that 
we can fix things overnight, and as a result, I think our view is so short term. 
That's true of the way we evaluate our business corporations, that's true 
of the way Wall Street analyzes performance .... I'm alarmed at this situa-
tion and I think we need to take a longer view and culturally that's going 
to be difficult for us to do. [U.S. Subcommittee on Science and Technology, 
1981, p. 297] 
Other critics of the current practices of U.S. management have voiced similar 
concerns: 
By their preference for servicing existing markets rather than creating new 
ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and "management by the 
numbers," many [U.S. businessmen) have effectively forsworn long-term 
technological superiority as a competitive weapon, ... maximum short-term 
financial returns have become the overriding criteria for many companies. 
[Hayes & Abernathy, 1980, p. 70] 
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If the decline in R&D expenditures is indeed the result of an increasing short-run 
orientation of U.S. management, it is important to detect the factors which may 
have led to the emergence of this mentality. In the discussion which follows, we 
shall analyze several factors which might explain how and why this attitude 
developed. 
III. REASONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHORT-RUN 
MENTALITY OF EXECUTIVES 
One possible factor involves the changing sociological and economic conditions 
of the post-World War II era. Executives of the 1950s and 1960s grew up in a 
world of affluence. Many believed that society would always prosper and that de-
mand would continue to grow. Business was running smoothly, profits were on 
the upswing and management was content. If a product was successful, a firm 
needed only to expand production at the right times and in the right places to 
meet demand and to increase earnings (Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 70). 
In the minds of many, one legacy of this period of rapid economic growth was 
a decline in the competitive spirit of U.S. business managers. Since the formulas 
in use at the time were conducive to high profit levels, it became increasingly dif-
ficult for these firms to undertake extensive long-range planning. The fact that 
the decade of the 1950s was itself a period of high R&D spending might, at first, 
seem difficult to explain; but it should be noted that during this period there were 
generally sufficient funds available for a firm to funnel into many different business 
activities, incuding R&D. As profit levels began to decline in the late 1960s and 
1970s, however, sufficient funds were no longer available to continue supporting 
all business activities at their previously high levels. In other words, during the 
relatively prosperous fifties, few managers had believed that the period of increas-
ing profits would one day come to an end-hence the lack of emphasis on strategies 
for the future. 
Many of today' s top executives were trained in and indeed became quite suc-
cessful by subscribing to these principles. What seemed to work in the 1960s, 
however, was not always successful in the late 1970s. Among other things, the 
U.S. population was no longer growing as quickly as before, and the demand for 
goods and services in general was not increasing at its former rate. The bottom 
line, of course, is that management did not respond quickly enough to meet a chang-
ing environment. 
Another possible reason for management's obsession with the short-term may 
lie in the increase in the number of chief executive officers (CEOs) with financial 
or legal backgrounds. Forty-five percent of executives in the top U.S. firms to-
day have received their training in either the financial or legal areas, as compared 
with only 18o/o with engineering training and 13o/o with training in technical 
research. By way of contrast, 52o/o of all Japanese manufacturing firms are headed 
by CEOs with engineering backgrounds (U.S. Subcommittee on Science and 
Technology, J. Arai, p. 256). 
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As more and more CEOs with financial expertise have assumed top corporate 
positions in the U .S., they have naturally brought with them a stronger emphasis 
on financial reporting. The principle of managing businesses by implementing prod-
uct and technological changes has tended to give way to a more intense focus on 
earnings reports and on financial methods. It has been said that the typical 
executive today is more likely to resemble a banker managing a portfblio of in-
vestments whose interest may lie more in buying and selling firms than in devel-
oping new products or new production methods (Business Week, June 30, 1980, 
p. 78). 
Three decades ago, most CEOs advanced from within the corporation's ranks. 
Most began at the bottom and held several positions in different areas of the firm 
before rising to the position of CEO. This manner of progression usually provided 
valuable "hands on" experience in the CEO's understanding of the firm's tech-
nology, marketing, sales and production techniques. When these executives finally 
reached the top, this experience enabled them to make intelligent production deci-
sions based on an intimate technical knowledge of the firm and the industry. 
Nowadays, however, firms are increasingly likely to choose their CEOs from out-
side their own ranks and, in many instances, even from outside their own indus-
tries. As we have stated previously, it is often difficult for a manager with technical 
training to appreciate the importance of technical R&D and various capital in-
vestment proposals. 
Some observers have placed part of the blame for the emergence of the short-
term orientation of U.S. management upon the educational institutions where most 
of today's CEOs were trained. As William Abernathy has noted: 
Schools followed the financial merger wave and the legal wave which began 
in industry. I think that it is true that we have not provided enough balance 
in the curriculum in terms of business aspects like production, workforce, 
and other behavioral subjects. We may have offered too much ... finance 
and emphasized financial control too much. [Business Week, June 30, 1980, 
p. 71] 
Yet another explanation for the change in management attitudes may lie in the 
changing structure of the typical U.S. firm. During the 1950s and 1960s as the 
U.S. economy experienced rapid economic growth, so also did the typical business 
corporation. Since many individual executives found themselves increasingly 
unable to effectively manage their growing organizations, decentralization often 
seemed to be the ideal solution. Profit centers were thus formed within many firms, 
whose· major purpose was to maximize both the earnings of the individual centers 
and those of its managers. Underlying this behavior was a type of "invisible hand" 
thinking-the belief that if each profit center did what was best for itself, the best 
interests of the organization would also be served. Only later did the flaw in this 
logic become apparent when allocations essential for R&D or equipment were not 
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made. In some cases the individual manager tried to avoid these expenditures 
so that his or her unit would appear to be more profitable in the short run. This 
increasingly accepted mentality of maximizing short-run gain is considered by 
many to be one of the major causes of the failure of American businessmen to 
replace aging plants and equipment with new, technologically superior ones. 
To cite just one example of the deleterious effects of this short-term men-
tality, let us take the case of the steel industry. The average U.S. steel plant is 
currently twenty years old, which is twice the average age of plants in West Ger-
many and in Japan. Moreover, between 1966 and 1976, capital investment per 
year as a percentage of GNP in West Germany was more than 20o/o greater than 
that in the U.S., while in Japan the percentage of GNP devoted to capital invest-
ment was nearly twice that of the U.S. (Day & Pascarella, 1980, p. 50). 
The sheer size of many U.S. organizations may be partially to blame for the 
development of the short-run managerial attitudes. The education and training 
received by many executives often emphasized the building of mammoth business 
empires. Too often, the size of the firm became a major criterion by which to 
measure the individual executive's degree of success. As a consequence, top 
management often strove to enlarge their enterprises. The subsequent increase 
in the size of the typical firm, however, often widened the gap between the various 
levels of management. In many firms, top management has become further and 
further removed from their employees. In the absence of better criteria with which 
to judge employee performance, more importance is placed upon short-term quan-
titative measures. While such a system often provides a uniform and readily iden-
tifiable set of performance criteria throughout the organization, it cannot pro-
vide an objective measure for functions such as R&D, entrepreneurial talents and 
long range planning. None of these functions easily lend themselves to statistical 
evaluation. For example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately quantify 
the ingenuity of an executive or to determine the worthiness of an expenditure 
for an R&D project which may have initially seemed plausible, but which did not 
ultimately succeed. The exclusive reliance, however, on quantification as the 
method for evaluating the productivity of managers and the profitability of specific 
projects can be harmful to the firm in two basic ways. First, in times of economic 
recession, a manager may be hit hard by events beyond his or her control. Cur-
rent conditions may preclude the manager from attaining company goals, and an 
evaluation based solely on "results" may reflect poorly upon this individual. 
Secondly, the over-reliance on quantitative methods of evaluation may create an 
environment which stifles the creative or innovative manager. The fear of even 
a temporary dip in reported earnings may induce him/her to discard a promising 
project or to decide against investing funds in a risky venture, even though it may 
promise considerable future profits. In the long run, then, a firm may be left 
without any innovative projects which might enable it to compete more effectively. 
Studies have shown that organizational size is inversely related to the number 
of innovations that appear. Innovative firms are most often those that stress 
creativity and do not seriously penalize failure. Because of the less rigid pyramidal 
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command system characteristic of smaller firms, such firms tend to rely less on 
quantitative performance evaluation and are more likely to encourage the genera-
tion of ideas. As a result, smaller firms are responsible for a disproportionately 
large fraction of revolutionary and/or large scale innovations (U.S. Congress, 
House Committee on Science and Aeronautics, 1967, p. 358). 
To the list of factors contributing to management's preoccupation with short-
term earnings and the resultant cuts in R&D spending might be added the so-
called "fear of Wall Street." The ultimate goal of many managers today seems 
to be the maximization of shareholders' earnings per share (EPS). In the late 1960s, 
the salaries and bonuses of top executives were increasingly tied to price/earn-
ings ratios (Day & Pascarella, 1980, p. 55). Stockholders and CEOs have both 
grown up in the same world of immediate gratification. Stockholders want vis-
ible returns "now." And while in an era of uncertainty this desire is understand-
able, pressure from shareholders to improve the EPS may often force managers 
to reject projects whose initial outlay would drastically reduce current earnings. 
Under increasing pressure to improve income each quarter, managerial focus is 
necessarily drawn toward the present. This fact can partially explain why intang-
ible programs such as R&D are more easily dropped in rough economic times. 
When firms are in need of capital and are looking to borrow, they will find few 
lenders who will be satisfied by the promise of future returns in lieu of present 
earnings. 
Many medium-sized firms often find themselves forced into implementing 
short-term remedies for long-term problems. In order to grow, it is necessary for 
firms to obtain equity capital. However, stock prices will usually respond only 
to very rapid growth. This can sometimes induce a firm to achieve rapid growth 
at the expense of the future of the firm. To cite an example, Microdata (a medium 
sized computer firm) has used techniques such as bypassing the establishment of 
a much needed direct sales force to avoid a large expense and subsequent decline 
in earnings. It has also announced a new computer model long before it was com-
mercially ready to order for the purpose of making an impact on Wall Street 
(Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 70). 
Perhaps one reason that U.S. businessmen have not sufficiently emphasized 
productivity growth over the longer term was that after World War II U.S. con-
sumers had almost no choice but to turn toward domestic corporations for their 
products. War-torn Europe and Asia offered virtually no competition in terms 
of technological knowledge, productive capabilities or quality control. U.S. 
businesses dominated world markets and were thus able to command high prices 
for products with varying degrees of quality. However, as foreign competitors 
gradually reindustrialized, U.S. businesses found themselves faced with unex-
pectedly stiff competition. This fact is most strikingly evidenced by the European 
and Japanese penetration of the auto, steel, and consumer electronics industries 
in the U.S. For example, in 1960 about 95o/o of all radios and television sets sold 
in the U.S. were supplied domestically. However, by 1979 foreign producers had 
captured 50o/o of this market (Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 59). In 1960, the 
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U.S. accounted for 25.3o/o of the world's exports. By 1978, this percentage had 
fallen to 17o/o (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980, p. 813). 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES 
In the previous sections, we have suggested the existence of an increasingly short-
run focus among top U.S. business executives. We have also offered explanations 
for the growth and development of this mentality. In this section we will discuss 
several consequences and manifestations of this short-run mentality in various 
areas of business practice. We will then relate these to the ability of U.S. businesses 
to compete effectively in world markets. 
One important consequence of this short-run focus on profits is the high degree 
of activity in the area of mergers and acquisitions. This action usually produces 
a surge in the price of a particular stock and can rapidly improve a firm's position 
on Wall Street. The real danger of excessive numbers mergers and acquisitions, 
however, is the resulting shift in emphasis away from the seeking of higher profits 
through innovation and improved technology. In 1978, there were 80 mergers 
in the U.S. involving companies with assets in excess of $100 million each; in 1979, 
there were nearly 100. This latter figure represents roughly $20 billion in transfers 
of large companies from one owner to another, fully two-thirds of the total amount 
spent in that year on R&D by U.S. industry. Such activity, however, creates no 
new product or value for the economy as a whole (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980, 
p. 75). 
Another consequence of the short-run orientation of management is the in-
creasing aversion to the undertaking of innovative, yet risky, projects. Although 
the initial outlays required may be large, the returns are usually neither certain 
nor immediate. As Burton G. Malkiel states: 
As in the case of investment, one can also see a shortening of horizon periods. 
The investment and R&D problems are the two ends of the same mustache. 
Our willingness to take risks, to commit resources to the future, is declin-
ing. We seem now to be motivated by the promise of a quick return rather 
than long-term growth. [Business Week, June 30, 1980, p. 70] 
Many experts claim that this short-run focus has increased risk premiums in finan-
cial markets. A higher risk premium means that a project must produce a higher 
return on investment in order to cover its cost of financing. Executives operating 
according to a short-run philosophy desire an immediate payback period, while 
a project offering high returns in future years might be considered too risky to 
be undertaken. This reasoning, of course, may lead to the adoption of fewer proj-
ects and, consequently, to fewer allocations for R&D. 
59 
There are two methods used to measure the trend of risk premiums. First, 
the spread between the yields on long-term government bonds and those of BAA 
corporate bonds gives a rough estimation of the risk premium (Malkiel, 1979, p. 
82). Secondly, risk premiums can be measured via anticipated equity returns, 
calculated by adding the expected growth rate to the dividend yield. The difference 
between this and the return on long-term Treasury securities is an alternative 
estimate of the risk premium. The results of both of the above methods are similar; 
and although risk premiums have fluctuated greatly, the trend in recent years 
has been generally upward. 
Managerial efforts directed exclusively toward the present can greatly en-
danger the long-run health of a firm in still another way. In order to improve the 
earnings in a given period, management may try to keep current expenses to a 
minimum. Aged or obsolete equipment may be repaired instead of replaced in an 
intensified program of cost reduction. Since older processes and processes in states 
of disrepair result in a lower quality product, such declines in dependability or 
workmanship may dampen a firm's ability to compete effectively in world markets. 
As Dr. Rahn of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce states: 
Whereas we were adding to our net capital stock at a 4.5% annual rate from 
1948-1968, we let that slip to a 3.6% rate during the 1970s. This includes 
significant amounts of legally mandated investment which may reduce pro-
ductivity. Net new investment is no longer sufficient to lower the average 
age of property, plant and equipment. Both plant and equipment have been 
aging since 197 4, something we last experienced during the Great Depres-
sion. Advances in technology largely enter the production process through 
new capital investment, and a slowdown in business investment implies that 
we are not fully utilizing the available technology. [U.S. Subcommittee on 
Science and Technology, 1981, p. 669] 
A related and equally important problem concerns the investment decision 
in human capital and the improvement of employee resources. The introduction 
of new technology must be considered not only from a technical standpoint, but 
from a behavioral and organizational standpoint as well. In both the short- and 
the long-run, skilled workers may be needed to operate new equipment and man 
new facilities. Unfortunately, necessary training programs are all too often thought 
of as a short-run variable cost; and should the economy take a turn for the worse, 
these programs are often the first to be cut. There is usually no immediate effect 
on production or productivity, and the cut has a positive effect on current net 
income. The need, however, for trained workers does not disappear. New 
technology requires new skills, and firms lacking employees with these skills will 
not be using their equipment to its potential, nor will they be able to compete 
effectively with other companies. As one critic states: 
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Disturbing evidence comes from a series of studies which suggest that our 
failing competitive advantage in foreign markets owes to our underinvest-
ment in human capital. The Bureau of International Labor Affairs reports 
that the declining U.S. trade performance since the sixties is the result of 
differences in the growth in net real investment in equipment and in the 
acquisition of labor skills through education and training. Between 1963 and 
1975, U.S. share of world's skilled workers fell from 29% to 26%. We have 
dropped from second to seventh in skill endowments of our workers. This 
results in the skill content of U.S. imports rising while U.S. exports steadily 
lose their competitive advantage. 
Analysis by Denison and Baily [1979] reports that between 1948 and 
1979, human capital improvements have accounted for an equal and perhaps 
a larger share of productivity growth than increases in machine capital per 
worker. [U.S. Subcommittee on Science and Technology, 1981, p. 752] 
V. CONCLUSION 
Summarizing the major ideas presented in this paper, we have stressed that the 
apparent short-run orientation of many U.S. executives today has been a natural 
result of the era in which they grew up and received their training-a period of 
"effortless" prosperity, abundant wealth, and record growth for many corpora-
tions. The psychology of this period simply did not encourage or anticipate future 
changes in the fortunes of business. When faced with the uncertain economics 
of today, CEOs imbued with this short-run mentality too often minimize the im-
portance of R&D, which does not have immediate positive effects on corporate 
profits. This situation has, in turn, contributed greatly to the problems faced by 
the U.S. today-problems such as declining productivity, a scarcity of trained labor, 
and a lower rate of commercialization in technologically innovative products. 
In the minds of many experts, American industry has lost its competitive edge 
in many world markets. The old formulas seem to be no longer valid, and the world 
business environment has changed. It now requires business executives to look 
beyond the current bottom line into the futures of their organizations in develop-
ing long-term strategies which again recognize the importance of R&D as a ma-
jor influence on productivity. The U.S. business community is truly at a crossroads, 
and it must now turn inward to reexamine, reevaluate and act positively in reorder-
ing its priorities. 
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